It’s Not Forty Acres & a Mule; It’s Only Two Hundred Dollars, Gate Money

by Chuck Hopple

A parolee, leaving prison with only two hundred dollars, forced to return to his own community where his parole officer will “closely observe” him, and with little to no resources or social services to assist his successful reentry back into society, has a tough row to hoe. Because I have spent the last two years at San Quentin’s H-Unit, which is predominantly a parole violators yard, I have witnessed many violators returning from parole, two, three, and four times. At first, I was very disappointed to see their return. I took their failed reentry personally, like it was me that had failed, as though their failure foretold my future. I became upset, and angry, and resentful towards them. I blamed them and made excuses for them, saying, “they are weak,” and “they are drug addicts,” and “they don’t want to change their behavior, or lifestyle, or environment,” and “this (prison) is all they know,” and worst yet, “they like it in prison; they feel safe there.”

Later, I began to question my own opinion. Could the parole system be intentionally designed and established to ensure parolees’ failure? The fact is, the parole system has miserably failed, as is clearly displayed by its records, huge increases in re-incarceration rates, yet it desperately needs restructuring, like a failed business which must downsize and sell off product lines, or subsidiary businesses, because they are unprofitable, or have lost market share, or lack proficiency, and consequently, release those entities to people, or other businesses, who are better suited to meet the desired results, increasing profits while decreasing expenses.

In one of my early college classes at Patten University, we were given an essay by Kelly Virella entitled, “Trapped by the System: Parole in America.” Her essay demonstrated how the parole system has clearly failed – incarceration rates dramatically increasing – and where this failure began. During the 1980’s, three significant factors took place: prison rehabilitation programs were cut; social services for parolees had been slashed; and state governments had enlarged their staff of parole officers. The increased amount of parole officers was implemented to provide a “greater attention” to parolees and offset both the lack of funding for social services and the lack of antidiscrimination laws against parolees. Virella cites a 1996 Rand study where it was determined that “greater attention” given to parolees by parole officers equates to an increase in parole violations and re-incarceration rates. This Rand study showed an increase of 27 percent of re-incarceration rates. The irony is that this result is exactly opposite of its intention – lowering re-incarceration rates. Further, she also cites a Department of Justice study (1990-1998), which revealed a more significant failure: a 54 percent increase of re-incarceration rates, in some states the percentage was even greater, and California had nearly a 70 percent increase. If this was a business and one equates the rise of incarceration rates to the rise of expenses, or lost profitability, then the conclusion is simple – cut and run. In other words, increase social services that would actually assist the parolee’s reentry into society, while meeting the desired objective of decreasing recidivism.

I recently had a conversation with my former bunkmate, Kelly, before he paroled on February 13, 2005. Kelly is forty-four, a heroin addict, and spent most of his adult life in prison. He has never had a legal drivers license, nor owned a car. All his “friends” share this type of life, not sex, drugs and rock-n-roll, but more like sex, drugs, and prison. Kelly has burned all his bridges to his local community, Santa Rosa, including that to his family. He was very worried and anxious about what he would actually do, where he would live and if he could find employment, once he paroled. We discussed his options, which were few. He believed that he had only two choices: go to the armory, a homeless shelter, or go from house to house of his friends. Kelly was at a crossroad; one way pointed to the possibility of a new life, the other, to the road well traveled and familiar. Kelly has since returned to San Quentin because of a parole violation, possession of a controlled substance. He didn’t even last two weeks. Kelly expressed to me, prior to him paroling, his deep desire to turn around his life, that he was real tired of coming to prison, and he desperately wanted to change. If only, if only…

Another inmate, Jimmy, is due to parole late March. He is going through the same mental torment that Kelly did: how to make a successful reentry. We have had several conversations about his options and choices. Jimmy is forty-one, and like Kelly, has spent many of his adult years in prison. He has determined only one option. Avoid at all costs returning to his community (Coco County), and he will go straight to San Francisco to Delancey Street, a sober living environment. Jimmy believes that if he returns to his community with no place to live, he, like Kelly, will be back using drugs quickly. However, there is no guarantee that he will be admitted when he shows up at Delancey Street, or not put on the waiting list. Jimmy will have two hundred dollars and a pair of sweats, but no sure place to live, no job, no car, no food, no extra underwear, no toiletries, and not even a picture I.D. It seems unfair, so problematic, and so fragile. Especially considering that he must meet ALL the parole conditions as determined by his parole officer and his “close scrutiny.” Jimmy may in fact be in violation from the gate, if Delancey Street is beyond the fifty-mile radius from Coco County parole office. What ever happened to the halfway houses of the past, where a parolee could obtain transitional housing? They no longer exist.

The current structure of the parole system does not function efficiently. If a business demonstrated years of great losses, year after year, as the parole system has demonstrated its inability to make a profit – decrease re-incarceration rates – it would be forced into bankruptcy. Why does the American taxpayer continue to support this ineptness? If the annual costs associated to house one inmate average $27,000, why has California not found a more economical solution other than warehousing its 172,000 inmates? Especially, since California’s re-incarceration rate is now well over 80 percent. This is simple economics and it defies logic and appears like an elephant in the living room that no one wants to discuss. Why do state governments continue to heap piles of money into this ever-growing abyss? If the Bush Administration was really concerned about a crisis, why have they avoided this crisis, only to point to the Social Security crisis, which does not exist? Not only does the parole system crisis have significant financial concerns, but also there are many lives hanging in the balance, by a thin thread. This thread was once a rope. It could support the weight of the parolee pulling himself up and into society. It once supported transitional housing, job assistance, more adept vocational training, and more parole options. But that was before the mid 1980’s, when the problem of sky-high re-incarceration rates wasn’t a problem, and before the states implemented their solution to a problem that only now exists because of their solution. The “Three Strikes and You’re Out Law” ensures permanent incarceration. Is the current parole system any different, only on the installment plan? If only, if only…